时间：2010年1月4日（周一）上午10：00-11：30
所在：伟易博治理学院二号楼217室
The Value of Information Sharing in
Managing Supply Side Uncertainty
(信息共享在供应方不确定性治理中的价值)
Abstract
This paperexamines the value ofinformationsharinginmanagingthe supply side uncertainty. We study a simple supply chainsettingconsisting of a group of manufacturers who order a homogeneous product from two suppliers. The two suppliers differ in their ability to fulfill orders– one always delivers orders and the other fulfills orders probabilistically. We model the supply chain as a Stackelberg game where the supplier who has uncertain reliability decides a wholesale price and the manufacturers who independently receive signals about the supplier’s reliability determine their sourcing strategies. We thendiscuss the conditions when the less reliable supplier would voluntarily and credibly share its reliability information. An information market is proposed to trade binary contracts with payoffs contingent on the supplier’s true reliability. The supply chain efficiency improvement is evaluated using a simple uniform demand distribution.
Fang Fang is Assistant Professor of College of Business Administration atCalifornia
