一、

Title: Exclusive Channels and Revenue Sharing in a Complementary Goods MarketSpeaker:Gangshu CAI，Associate professor, Leavey School of Business, Santa Clara University

Time: 1:30-3:00pm, 27th June, 2012

Location: Room 217, New Building of GSM, Peking University

Abstract

This paper evaluates the joint impact of exclusive channels and revenue sharing on suppliers and retailers in a hybrid duopoly common retailer and exclusive channel model. The model bridges the gap in the literature on hybrid multichannel supply chains with bilateral complementary products and services with or without revenue sharing. The analysis indicates that, without revenue sharing, the suppliers are reluctant to form exclusive deals with the retailers; thus, no equilibrium results. With revenue sharing from the retailers to the suppliers, it can be an equilibrium strategy for the suppliers and retailers to form exclusive deals. Bargaining solutions are provided to determine the revenue sharing rates. Our additional results suggest forming exclusive deals becomes less desirable for the suppliers if revenue sharing is also in place under nonexclusivity. In our extended discussion, we also study the impact of channel asymmetry, an alternative model with fencing, composite package competition, and enhanced price-dependent revenue sharing.

二、

Title: Quality and Pricing Decisions in a Market with Consumer Information Sharing

Speaker: Baojun Jiang，Assistant Professor of Marketing, Washington University in St. Louis

Time: 3:00-4:00pm, 27th June, 2012

Location: Room 217, New Building of GSM, Peking University

Abstract

We provide a dynamic, game-theoretic model to examine a firm’s quality and pricing decisions in a market in which early consumers do not observe product quality prior to purchase but after purchase they can share product information online and hence reveal the true product quality to later consumers. The firm has private information about its cost efficiency and makes an endogenous quality decision whereas consumers are uncertain about both the firm’s cost efficiency and its chosen product quality. Our analysis shows that the firm’s early-period price can serve as a credible signal for its cost efficiency and its chosen product quality. We find that a more cost-efficient firm always chooses a higher quality and makes more profits than a less efficient firm. One might intuit that, if consumers can observe firm’s cost efficiency, the more efficient firm will have more incentives to invest in quality and should increase its quality because the less efficient firm can no longer mimic the more efficient firm. Surprisingly, the opposite may be true—when a firm’s high efficiency is publicly known, it may reduce its product quality rather than increase it.

Welcome to attend!